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Abstract
Countries pledge ever increasing budgets and commitments to host the Olympics. The region whose bid emerges victorious puts in motion the reallocation of inputs, labor, and capital
to build all the promised infrastructure to run the event, while the remaining areas in country
remain largely unaffected by the intervention. This quasi-experiment scenario is proper for
the usage of the Synthetic Control Method but few papers have exploited it. This paper fills
the gap by being the first to offer an analysis at local level for a developing economy on the
impact of the Olympics. Using Rio de Janeiro’s winning bid for the 2016 Olympics in 2009,
this paper utilizes annual data from 2000 to 2019 to estimate the impact of the intervention
when compared to its synthetic control simulating the absence of such. I estimate a statistically significant average increase in income inequality by .026 in the Gini index due to the
Olympics. Furthermore, the estimations show no statistically significant impact of the event
for per capita GDP and net admissions into the labor market. The results are consistent with
the previous literature and also backs the claims of disillusionment with regards to the benefits
of the Olympics by citizens.
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Introduction

Countries compete fiercely in conference rooms and offices for hosting the Olympics as they do in
track and field, pools, and on the pitch as athletes strive for the gold medal. While Nations awarded
with hosting the event pitch and pledge ever increasing commitments and budgets, ex post evidence
from academics show that the economic benefits to the taxpayer and host city are rather limited.
Nonetheless, few studies have exploited the fact that the hosting of the event acts as a quasiexperiment, as the city hosting the event acts receives the “treatment” while the rest of the country
remains devoid of the intervention, acting as the control group; thus, a scenario that is proper for the
use of the Synthetic Control Method. On October 2, 2009, during the 121st International Olympic
Committee Session, Rio de Janeiro was selected as host for the 2016 Summer Olympics. This
paper estimates the impacts at state level on GDP per capita, net admissions into the job market,
and income inequality measured by the Gini index following the confirmation of Rio de Janeiro as
host of the Olympics.
Gauging the causal effects of “mega-events” such as the Olympics is essential in shedding light
into the economic and social impacts that are generated by them (or the lack thereof). On one hand,
promoters and other interested parties, through ex ante analyses, guarantee the positive impacts
of the Olympics, generated by global exposure and urban renewal. On the other, constituents
from host and bidding countries appear to display a different tone towards the event: in 2013,
residents of St. Moritz and Davos rejected the cities joint bid for the 2022 Winter Olympics through
referendum; throughout late 2013 and most of 2014, Germany’s Munich, Sweden’s Stockholm,
Poland’s Krakow, and Norway’s Oslo followed suite and withdrew their bids; the common theme
throughout the withdraws was a disillusionment surrounding the windfall generated by the Winter
Olympics (see “Norway withdraws Oslo bid” (2014)).
The confirmation of a given city as host of the Olympics green-lights expenditures and reallocation of resources that would not have happened otherwise. While the procurement and construction work done for sports venues, roads, airports, and utilities necessary for properly running
the Olympics generates demand for inputs, the main concern for the host city and its constituents
1

is whether such investments were able to generate permanent benefits, by attracting investments,
creating jobs, increasing trade, boosting productivity, reducing inequality, bringing more tourists
and so forth, guaranteeing prosperity beyond the short-run.
However, the ex post academic research backs the constituents concerns surrounding the Olympics.
The literature is overwhelmingly in consensus regarding the lack of a statistically significant positive correlation between the public provision of sports venues and economic development (see
Baade and Dye (1990), Baade (1996), Zimbalist and Noll (1997), and Coates and Humphreys
(1999)). Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) defines three key reasons behind the failure of the public
provision of sports venues in promoting economic development: substitution effects, leakages and
the multiplier effects, and budgetary impact. Extending the analysis for the Olympics, Baade et al.
(2002) claim that the economic impacts of the Olympics are likely transitory if the “...infrastructure for the Games lack synergy, or worse, if it displaces or competes with resident or established
capital and labour...” and, due to the intense bidding process, the winning bid, at best, “...would
be consonant with a zero economic return on the investment if opportunity costs are included in
the bidding calculus.” Zimbalist (2016) notes that, following the modest profitability of 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles, budgets pledged for hosting the games have increased as did the
number of developing economies participating in the bidding, which bring the following set of
problems: as values spent on bids increase – a “winner’s curse” as the author points out – they
further drive away from the recipe success used on 1984, which was to keep infrastructure costs
at a minimum by utilizing the same venues from the 1932 at Los Angeles; developing countries
have the added challenge of featuring fragile institutions, which may divert the increased budgets
to wasteful spending and embezzlement schemes, further reinforcing the already present patterns
of inequality.
Few studies that exploited the fact that cities awarded with the hosting and the rest of their
respective countries are actively participants in a quasi-experiment scenario used the Synthetic
Control Method (as developed by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), Abadie
(2021)) to gauge the impact of the Olympics on variables outside the sphere of economics, such as
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air quality in Beijing 2008 (Zhang et al., 2016), COVID-19 cases in Tokyo 2020 (Esaka and Fujii,
2022), or medals obtained (Barbosa et al., 2016); to the knowledge of the author, only Johnson
(2020) and Kobierecki and Pierzgalski (2022) gauged the economic impacts of the Olympics, at
local level for the last three Olympics on American soil and at country level, respectively. Therefore, this paper fills the gap in the literature by providing an economic assessment at state level for
the Olympics in a developing country through the Synthetic Control approach.
This paper utilizes annual data, from 2000 to 2019, for the 26 states plus the Federal District, for
per capita GDP, net admissions into labor market, and income inequality through the Gini index and
its respective predictors, made available by the Institute of Applied Economic Research in Brazil.
The Synthetic Control Method involves constructing the “artificial” treated region, simulating the
absence of the intervention, by minimizing the distance between the actual covariates for treated
region and a weighted combination of the same covariates for the control regions encompassing
the periods prior to the event; such covariates not only include predictors but also pre-intervention
lagged outcome variables; thus, the gap for the desired outcome variables post-intervention can be
measured by comparing the actual values with the synthetic ones.
The paper is organized as follows: section two offers an overview of the International Olympic
Committee, the Games, bidding process, financing and the budgetary structure; section three describes the data that are used; section four delves into the inner workings and assumptions of the
Synthetic Control Method; section five highlights the results of my analysis and briefly discusses
them; and the final section offers a conclusion and final remarks about the paper.

2

Event Background

The International Olympic Committee, as defined by its Olympic Charter, is a not-for-profit nongovernmental international organization, established to act in stewardship over the “Olympic properties” and the principles of “Olympism” as laid out by its charter. Due to the monopoly over the
“Olympic brand”, countries that are interested in having its designated city host the Olympiad need

3

to engage in the creation of their respective National Olympic Committees, which essentially acts
as the franchisee for the International Olympic Committee, by abiding to its Charter. Only then can
the National Olympic Committee set up its Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games, which
reports directly to the International Olympic Committee Executive Board (Theodoraki, 2007, p.
54-57).
Countries compete amongst themselves by pitching its host city’s bid portfolio. The bid’s
portfolios include, among many other factors, economic guarantees, information on the host city,
plans and the legacy of the facilities to be built. The bidding process takes place during an International Olympic Committtee Session between seven and eleven years before the start of the
Olympics. The bid selection is not just influenced by technical metrics but also through diplomacy and communication campaigns domestically and abroad as the selection phase reaches its
last stages (Theodoraki, 2007, p. 113-114).
The event’s budget is divided between the Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games expenditures and the Non Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games expenditures. The former
represents expenses associated with the actual running of the event (e.g. torch relay, opening and
closing ceremonies, and so forth) and are backed by a mix of money coming from the International Olympic Committee, sponsors, ticket sales, subsidies by the local government and other
sources; the latter relates to expenditures associated with the infrastructure surrounding the event
(e.g. sports venues, airports, roads, railways, ports, utilities, and so forth), that it’s not covered by
the International Olympic Committee. The revenues generated by broadcast rights are divided
solely between the International Olympic Committee (which is then shared with the National
Olympic Committees) and the local Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (Rio 2016
Bid Committee, 2009).
On October 2, 2009, during the 121st International Olympic Committee Session, Rio de Janeiro’s
bid for the 2016 Olympics emerged victorious, beating the cities of Madrid (runner-up), Chicago,
and Tokyo. Zimbalist (2017) suggests that the Non Organizing Committee of the Olympic Games
budget was above $20 billion , far surpassing the pledged bid of $14.4 billion, and over the reported
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$15 billion for the 2012 Games in London (McCarthy, 2021). Little over month heading into the
event, the governor of Rio de Janeiro declared state of financial emergency (Watts, 2016).

3

Data

Yearly data was obtained from the Institute of Applied Economic Research, from 2000 to 2019, for
all 26 states plus the federal district. The outcome variables being analyzed are: per capita GDP
(thousand of Brazilian Reals), net admissions into labor market (generated from data available for
admissions and layoffs), and Gini index. Predictors for per capita GDP were sectoral shares of
GDP, openness index (imports plus exports as share of GDP), human capital indicators (percentage of individulals with regards to illiteracy and high school diploma, percentage of households
with electricity, access to adequate water supply and treatment, and trash service), and credit applications (thousand of Brazilian Reals); for Gini index analysis, the social vulnerability index,
per capita income, and population; and for net admissions, human capital indicators already mentioned, per capita GDP, credit applications, and population. Additionally, lagged values for all
pre-intervention periods were used as covariates when estimating the outcome variables. Table 1
displays the summary statistics for the outcome variables.

4
4.1

Empirical Strategy
Synthetic Control Method

The idea behind comparative case studies resides on gauging the impact of an event, intervention,
or policy on the treated region between two states: with it and without it. The latter is a factually
impossible event; thus, the impact is gauged by comparing the treated region with a neighboring
area, a region that display similarity with the treated, or the average of selected areas. The Synthetic
Control Method – as developed in Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003), Abadie et al. (2010), and
Abadie (2021) – approaches the selection of the control regions differently by using a weighted
5

combination of the control regions, therefore, creating a control region that artificially resembles
the treated region without the treatment.
In general terms, suppose we have J + 1 regions, so that: j = 1, 2, . . . , J + 1. Assuming the
first one is the exclusive target of a certain intervention, we shall have the remaining units as the
“donor pool”, the untreated regions not affected by the intervention. Let us also assume that there
are T time periods, and that T0 is the amount of periods before the intervention. For each unit j,
we have a set of k predictors, X1 j , X2 j , . . . , Xk j , which may include pre-intervention values for the
dependent variable. Then, the k × 1 vector X1 will contain the predictors for the treated region,
while the k × J vector X0 = [X2 ...XJ+1 ] is its counterpart for the “donor pool”.
For each unit j, at time period t, we can define the outcome variable without the treatment as
Y jtN . For the treated region, for periods t > T0 after the intervention, we define the outcome variable
as Y1tI . Then, the effect of the intervention for the post-treatment periods is:
τ1t = Y1tI −Y1tN .
The question then is how to estimate Y1tN for both the pre and post-intervention periods. As
mentioned previously, the unit of comparison used in the Synthetic Control Method is the “synthetic” treated region, by using the weighted average of the regions present in the “donor pool”.
The weights are chosen so that the dependent variable pre-intervention values for the “synthetic”
region closely match the actual pre-intervention values. Thus, given a set of non-negative constants
v1 , ..., vk , the synthetic control J × 1 vector W∗ = (w∗2 , ..., w∗J +1 )′ is chosen such that it minimizes:
||X1 − X0 W|| = [∑kh=1 vh (Xh1 − w2 Xh2 − ... − wJ +1 XhJ +1 )2 ]1/2
subject to the restriction that the weights are non-negative and w2 + ... + wJ +1 = 1. The estimated
treatment effect for the treated unit for the post-intervention periods is:
+1 ∗
τ̂1t = Y1tI − ∑Jj=
2 w j Y jt

The k ×1 vector V = (v1 , ..., vk ) weigh in the importance of the synthetic control in reproducing
the values for each of the k predictors for the treated unit, X11 , ..., Xk1 . Selecting the optimal values
6

for v1 , ..., vk – as suggested by Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) and Abadie et al. (2010) – involve
minimizing the mean square prediction error for the pre-intervention periods with respect to Y1tN :
T

∑t 0 (Y1t − w2 (V)Y2t − ... − wJ +1 (V)YJ +1t )2
and which is the approach I shall be using in this paper.

4.2

Inference

Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie (2021) suggest a mode of inference through a series of placebo
tests, where the synthetic control is applied to the control regions. If the unaffected areas showcase
similar magnitudes in the gaps for the considered outcome variables when compared to the treated
region, then the analysis of the latter does not produce significant evidence of the impact of the
intervention. The authors created a test statistic in order to gauge for all regions the goodness-offit for the pre-intervention periods and the magnitude of the impact post-intervention through the
following:
N
R j (t1 ,t2 ) = ( t2 −t11 +1 ∑tt21 (Y jt − Yˆjt )2 )1/2

which is the root mean square prediction error. Then, it is possible to calculate the quality of the
fit post-intervention with regards to quality of fit pre-intervention by:
rj =

R j (T0 +1,T )
.
R j (1,T0 )

A p-value for the inference, based on the permutation distribution of r j , is given by:
p=

J +1
1
I+ (r j − r1 )
J +1 ∑1

where I+ represents an indicator function that returns the value of one for non-negative values of

(r j − r1 ) and zero otherwise. In order to better gauge inference, the authors suggest removing
from the donor pool the units that feature a bad fit for the synthetic control in the pre-intervention
periods.
7

4.3

Assumptions

Abadie (2021) highlights the following contextual requirements that must hold in order for the
Synthetic Control be an appropriate approach for intervention evaluation. The effect of the intervention, regardless of how large it is, can be difficult to detect if one does not account for the
volatility that may be present in the outcome variable of choice. The availability of a suitable
control group, by avoiding including regions that feature similar interventions such as the one in
the treatment or may have suffered from idiosyncratic shocks which would have not occurred in
the absence of the intervention and, moreover, restricting the “donor pool” to regions with characteristics similar to the treatment region. Anticipation effects by forward-looking agents should
be avoided by backdating the period in which the intervention comes into play. Spillover effects
should be accounted for by either discarding units that may be affected by such from the “donor
pool” or by the research actively accounting for the bias coming from the control regions also
affected by the treatment. The pre-intervention values for the outcome variable in the treatment
region must be closely tracked by the synthetic control. Lastly, the need for a suitable amount of
post-treatment periods in order to accurately gauge the intervention.

5
5.1

Results
Synthetic Control Estimates

Figure 1 shows the trends for per capita GDP between Rio de Janeiro and the average of the rest
of Brazil. Figure 2, likewise, shows the trajectories between Rio de Janeiro and the average of
the “donor pool” for net admissions, and one can observe the dramatic contraction in the labor
market faced by the former for the year of 2015. Figure 3, similarly, displays the trends between
the treatment region and the average of the control regions for income inequality measured by the
Gini index. Visually, it is possible to notice that the average of the remaining Brazilian states does
not closely match the trend shown by the state of Rio de Janeiro for the periods prior to 2009.
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Through the synthetic control it is possible to generate a counter factual that closely follows for
the pre-intervention periods.
As mentioned in the previous section, the synthetic control chooses the weights as to minimize
the distance between the covariates for the treated and control regions. Table 3 shows that the per
capita GDP trends simulating the absence of the intervention were best reproduced by a combination of the states of Amapá, Espı́rito Santo, Mato Grosso, and São Paulo. For net admissions,
Table 4, the synthetic best reproduced the actual pre-intervention values from a combination of the
states of Ceará, Paraná, and São Paulo. For Gini index, Table 5 displays that the synthetic control
is best constructed by the combination of the states of Alagoas, Paraná, Rondônia, Santa Catarina,
and the Federal District. Table 2 displays the average values for the outcome variables, before and
after the time of the intervention, for Rio de Janeiro and the “donor regions”.
Figure 4 shows the trends of the actual per capita GDP values and its synthetic counterpart. After the intervention it is possible to observe how per capita GDP faced a reversal of fortunes, peaking in 2014 (about 1000 Brazilian Reals higher) and, for the remaining periods, the synthetic shows
that per capita GDP would be higher in the absence of the Olympics (for 2016, per capita GDP
was estimated as approximately 2750 Brazilian Reals lower). On average, for all post-intervention
periods, per capita GDP decreased by 650 Brazilian Reals. Figure 5 shows more clearly the gap
between actual and synthetic values. Inference is gauged through the placebo test, as explained in
the previous section, by applying the synthetic control for the control regions. Figure 6 show the
gap trends for the treated and control regions and it can be observed that the trajectory of the former
cannot be easily distinguished from the rest of units being analysed; furthermore, the root mean
squared prediction error for the pre-intervention periods for the treatment showcased a goodnessof-fit that was worse than the values for the placebo runs in the donor pool; thus, we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of zero impact on per capita GDP due to the intervention.
Figure 7 displays the trajectories for both Rio de Janeiro and its synthetic control, showcasing
how the method constructs a closely-matching counterfactual for the pre-interention periods. After
the intervention, again, there is a crossing point between the trends, with the year of 2016 being
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particularly evident (as shown in Figure 8) on the contraction of the labor market, estimating that
the intervention actually cut an additional 134,000 job positions. On total, the additional aggregate contraction was estimated at 286,102 posts approximately. Figure 9 display the placebo test,
showing a very distinct trajectory of the treated unit in comparison with the control regions for the
post-intervention periods; however, when analysing for the goodness-of-fit in the pre-intervention
periods, the treatment displayed a value that was above most of the placebo runs in the donor pool;
thus, this subpar fit places a caveat on the statistical significance of the analysis.
Lastly, Figure 10 presents the trends for the actual and the synthetic values for the Gini index.
Following the intervention, the trends for the synthetic control and the treated diverges, estimating
higher income inequality levels for all post-intervention periods. Figure 11 shows that the gap
between the treatment and synthetic peaks at approximately a .06 in inequality. Figure 12 shows
the placebo test; with a root mean squared prediction error of .004963 and .029 for the pre and
post-intervention periods, respectively, the treatment displayed the second-to-best fit and the synthetic trend for it was significant for a 10% level (the p-value is approximately .076), thus offering
evidence for income inequality being generated by the intervention.

5.2

Difference-in-Differences Robustness Checks

As further backing to the estimation done through the Synthetic Control Method, I also run the
simple canonical difference-in-difference model to estimate the impact of the intervention for the
outcome variables through the following model:
OutcomeVariableit = β0 + β1 ∗ Olympicsit + β2 ∗ Post2009it + β3 ∗ Interactionit + eit
where i indexes the variables between the two regions considered, Rio de Janeiro and the Synthetic
Rio de Janeiro, while t indexes the years in the sample, from 2000 to 2019; Olympicsit is a dummy
variable that takes the value of one if the intervention took place, zero otherwise; Post2009it is a
dummy variable that equals one for all periods after the year 2009; Interactionit , as the name implies, is the product of the aforementioned dummies, capturing the effect of the intervention, after
10

controlling it for time and location. Table 6 reports the result of the regression and the estimates
reported match the synthetic control analysis: for both per capita GDP and net admissions, the
effect of the intervention was correlated to an average contraction of 645 Brazilian Reals, roughly
4.6% of the average per capita GDP reported, and little under 29,500 jobs, a decrease of 113.5% of
the average number of positions for the sample,; nonetheless, the parameters were not statistically
significant in order to reject the null hypothesis; for income inequality, the intervention is correlated to an average effect of increasing the Gini index .026, and was statistically significant for a
5% level, offering a strong argument for the Olympics actually increasing the disparity in the host
region.

5.3

Discussion

The statistically insignificant results for the impact of the Olympics on both per capita GDP and net
admissions reflect the consensus shown by the previous literature. Vartanian and Garbe (2019) reports that the Brazilian economy faced eleven consecutive quarters of economic contraction, from
the second quarter of 2014 to the fourth quarter of 2016; due fiscal rules arrangement between
states and the federal government in Brazil, crises that affect the balance-of-payments of the country spillover to the regional balance, the state of Rio de Janeiro being definitely affected. The big
dent in public budgets due to the Olympics, thus, may have been only one of the many nails in the
coffin of the state’s fiscal health, as Bonomo et al. (2021) report Rio de Janeiro being a traditionally
reckless spender.
The year of 2015 is one of particular note when observing the figures, as both per capita GDP
and net admissions faced significant contraction. The reasoning behind the results is due to the
fact that the macroeconomic readjustment period began in 2015, the first full year of contraction,
and policies such as short-term interest rates hikes (325 basis points, from the fourth quarter of
2014 to the second quarter of 2015), austerity measures for the accumulation of trade surpluses,
alongside the reaction by the market, such as decreased credit rating (Vartanian and Garbe, 2019).
All events contribute to a deflationary and contraction period for the economy, with companies
11

cutting on inventories, investing less, and hiring fewer workers, if not contracting their staff. Thus,
the downturn shown in per capita GDP and net admissions from 2014 and 2016 was more likely
due to the recession faced by the country, instead of the intervention.
The significance of the estimates surrounding the increased income inequality raises then the
question of what might be the chain of causation for such phenomena. I suggest one of the reasons
behind such shifts in wealth may lie in the displacement of lower-income populations, as households and business are required to move from their original location in order to make space for
the construction work required for the planned infrastructure for the Olympics. Zimbalist (2017)
reports how 77,000 individuals had to be evicted from their houses and businesses for the construction of a bus rapid transit line; in short, at a single stroke, thousands may lose asset ownership
and source of income, regardless of how small they might be. The displacement might as well
”hollow-out” the middle income jobs in favor of reallocation towards the lower-skill spectrum,
such as construction work, and while the construction of all the infrastructure may demand that
type of labor, the excess of low-skill laborers in the Brazilian workforce might drive down returns.
The dent on public budgets may also exert a negative impact on income transfers and access to
government pension schemes, further restricting sources of income for the lower spectrum of the
population.

6

Conclusion

This paper explores the effects that arise when a country is selected as the host of the Olympics on
per capita GDP, net admissions into the labor market, and income inequality through Gini index
by analysing the winning bid of Rio de Janeiro for the 2016 Summer Games.
By using the Synthetic Control Method, I find that the intervention increased income inequality
in the state of Rio de Janeiro, through an average increase .026 units in the Gini index, and was
statistically significant for a 5% level. Additionally, effects on per capita GDP and net admissions
were found to be negative but statistically insignificant. All results match the consensus found
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previously in the literature but this body work represents, to the best of the author’s knowledge, the
first to gauge the economic effects of the Olympics at a regional level for a developing economy
through the aforementioned method. Equally as important, this paper also offers further backing
to the disillusionment surrounding the benefits of the Olympics as shown by citizens in polls and
referendums, effectively stopping the bidding for hosting the event.

13
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Figure 1: Trends in per capita GDP: Rio de Janeiro vs. rest of Brazil
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Figure 2: Trends in net admissions into job market: Rio de Janeiro vs. rest of Brazil
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Figure 3: Trends in inequality by the Gini index: Rio de Janeiro vs. rest of Brazil
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Figure 4: Trends in per capita GDP: Rio de Janeiro vs. synthetic Rio de Janeiro
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Figure 5: Per capita GDP gap between Rio de Janeiro and its synthetic control
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Figure 6: Per capita GDP gap in Rio de Janeiro and placebo gaps for the rest of Brazil
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Figure 7: Trends in net admissions: Rio de Janeiro vs. synthetic control
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Figure 8: Net admissions gap between Rio de Janeiro and its synthetic control

2000

2005

2010
year

23

2015

2020

gap net admissions
-250000 -150000 -50000 50000 150000 250000

Figure 9: Net admissions gap in Rio de Janeiro and placebo gaps for the rest of Brazil
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Figure 10: Trends in inequality by Gini index: Rio de Janeiro vs. synthetic Rio de Janeiro
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Figure 11: Gini index gap between Rio de Janeiro and its synthetic control
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Figure 12: Gini index gap in Rio de Janeiro and placebo gaps for the rest of Brazil
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Table 1: Summary statistics for the outcome variables

28

Table 2: Averages for the outcome variables, before and after the intervention, for the “donor
locations and Rio de Janeiro
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Table 3: State weights in synthetic Rio de Janeiro for per capita GDP analysis
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Table 4: State weights in synthetic Rio de Janeiro for net admissions analysis
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Table 5: State weights in synthetic Rio de Janeiro for Gini index analysis
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Table 6: Differences-in-Differences estimates (standard errors in parentheses)
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